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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE METHOD AND TIME OF PLEADING DILATORY
AND DECLINATORY EXCEPTIONS
LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1870:
Article 331: There are two principal species of exceptions;
some are dilatory, others peremptory.
Dilatory exceptions are divided into declinatory and those
simply called dilatory.1
Article 333 (as amended by La. Act. 124 of 1936): It is a rule
which governs in all cases of exceptions, except in such as relate
to the absolute incompetency of the judge before whom the suit
is brought, that they must be pleaded specially in limine litis, be-
fore issue joined, otherwise they shall not be admitted.
Hereafter no dilatory exceptions shall be allowed in any case
after a judgment by default has been taken; and in every case
they must be pleaded in limine litis and at one and the same
time, otherwise they shall not be admitted; nor shall such excep-
tions hereafter be allowed in any answer in any cause.
Article 336: Declinatory exceptions may be pleaded in the de-
fendant's answer previous to his answering to the merits; but, ex-
cept as relates to the declinatory exceptions, the defendant must
plead in his answer all dilatory or peremptory exceptions2 on
which he intends to rely, or which he is bound to plead expressly
and specially, pursuant to the provisions of this Code.3
A problem which confronts all systems of practice is the need
to dispose of all procedural objections in advance of trial on the
merits and at the same time to prevent the defendant from em-
ploying dilatory tactics which unduly delay the trial on its merits.
Hence, to prevent the practice of "stringing out" preliminary con-
tests over alleged procedural defects is a result desired by all sys-
tems of procedure. It is the purpose of this comment to give a
brief history of the pertinent code provisions, and to discuss the
1. The English text of Art. 331 (2), La. Code of Practice of 1825 provided
that "Dilatory exceptions are divided into declinatory and dilatory excep-
tions." The French text of this article, however, reads: "Les dilatoires se divi-
sent en d~clinatoires et en dilatoires simplement dites." The provision of the
Code of Practice of 1870 presents a more correct translation of the French
text of the Code of 1825.
2. Art. 343, La. Code of Practice of 1870, divides peremptory exceptions
into those relating to form and those founded on law, and Art. 344 provides
that the former must be pleaded in limine. Those founded on law may be
pleaded at any time prior to definitive judgment, and even in the appellate
court. Arts. 346, 902, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
3. The articles cited above are those of La. Code of Practice of 1870.
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effect of recent decisions-construing these provisions-upon the
mode and manner of pleading dilatory and declinatory exceptions
under Louisiana practice.
The origin of the pertinent articles of the Code of Practice of
1825 is found in the procedure of Spain and France.' Under early
Spanish procedure no fixed delays were prescribed by positive
law, but the judge was empowered to fix a delay in which the
defendant had to file all exceptions.6 Positive law, under Spanish
practice of the latter part of the eighteenth century, fixed the de-
lay for the filing of exceptions, 6 while French procedure under the
Code Louis7 required all dilatory exceptions to be pleaded at the
same time (par un mgme acte) .s Thus, it can be seen that the sys-
tems of practice from which our own code provisions are descended
adequately prevented any stringing out of the dilatory exceptions
so as to delay the trial of the cause on its merits.
Similarly, this objectionable practice was suppressed by three
provisions of the Code of Practice of 1825. First-Article 336 af-
forded a line of defense against any stringing out of exceptions by
providing that while the defendant might plead his declinatory
exceptions either by filing them prior to answer, or by incorporat-
ing them in the answer, all dilatory exceptions must be pleaded in
the answer. The three exceptions to the latter requirement,9 cov-
ering special circumstances, detracted little from the efficacy of
the article. Thus, small opportunity was afforded for the employ-
ment of dilatory tactics by the defendant. In passing, there should
be observed the striking similarity between these requirements
and the corresponding provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.10 Second-Article 333 announced the general rule that
all exceptions "must be pleaded specially in limine litis, before is-
4. See Projet of the Code of Practice of 1825, 2 La. Legal Archives (Offi-
cial Reprint, 1938) 58-59.
5. Las Siete Partidas, 3. 3. 9. It is interesting to note that exactly the
same procedure was followed by a federal judge in Louisiana only recently.
Sartar v. United Gas Public Service, 3 Fed. Supp. 943 (D.C. La. 1933).
6. Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos (1790) 126-128, parte II, lib. III, Nos.
215-216.
7. The celebrated Ordonnance Ctvkle ordained by Louis XIV in 1667.
8. Pothier, Trait6 de la Procedure Civile, Part. I, Chap. II, Sec. III 6
Oeuvres de Pothier (Merlin ed. 1831) 9.
9. Peremptory exceptions founded on law are pleadable at any state of the
proceedings prior to definitive judgment. Art. 346, La. Codes of Practice of
1825 and 1870. The exception of improper cumulation of actions and that of
want of procedural capacity did not have to be pleaded in the answer. Cf.
Arts. 152, 320-321, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870.
10. Rule 12.
19381
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sue joined, otherwise they shall not be admitted."'" This provision
would appear to govern both declinatory exceptions and dilatory
exceptions (properly speaking) .11 Third-Article 344 required that
all peremptory exceptions relating to form 3 should be filed in
limine.
In view of the articles just mentioned, it becomes important to
determine what constituted joinder of issue. Article 35714 provided
that "The cause is at issue when the defendant has answered,
either by confessing or denying the facts set forth in the petition,
or by pleading such dilatory or peremptory exceptions as he is
bound to plead in limine litis, pursuant to the provisions of this
Code." In addition to this express joinder of issue, issue could also
be joined tacitly. 5
The provisions of the Code of Practice of 1825 prevented the
stringing out of exceptions by the following rules. Declinatory ex-
ceptions might be pleaded either prior to the filing of an answer,
or incorporated therein. Dilatory exceptions and peremptory ex-
ceptions relating to form could only be filed by pleading them in
the answer. The effect of filing this answer was to join issue, and
thus foreclose the filing of any subsequent exception. 16
These excellent code provisions were to operate efficiently for
11. The exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the court was not
required to be pleaded in the answer. This exception cannot be waived. Art.
92, La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870.
12. This article is included in the Code of Practice in the section entitled
"Of Dilatory Exceptions." The corresponding French title in the Code of Prac-
tice of 1825, however, read "Des Exceptions Dilatoires En Gdn~ral." Cf. Phipps
V. Snodgrass, 31 La. Ann. 88 (1879). It might be argued that to have this ar-
ticle apply to declinatory exceptions would permit a plaintiff to sue a defend-
ant without citing him, then foreclose the lack of citation by taking a default.
The answer to such a contention, however, lies in the fact that the court can-
not join issue tacitly by a default judgment unless process has been served.
Robinson v. Enloe, 10 La. App. 435, 121 So. 320 (1929).
13. Despite the code recognition of the peremptory exception relating to
form, we have no such exceptions in Louisiana procedure. The classification is
that of Pothier, but by reason of the Spanish exceptions having been followed,
this classification is meaningless today. Thus the exception to the citation is
a peremptory exception relating to form (nulitd) in French procedure; but
it is a declinatory one in Louisiana. Similarly the exception to procedural
capacity is a peremptory exception as to form in French practice; it is a dila-
tory one in Louisiana. On this point, see McMahon, Parties Litigant in Louisi-
ana-II (1937) 11 Tulane L. Rev. 527, 540.
14. La. Codes of Practice of 1825 and 1870.
15. Tacit joinder of issue occurred in two ways. First, by the taking of
a default. Sandeman v. Deake & Willard, 17 La. 332 (1841). Second, by appear-
ing at the trial and failing to object to the introduction of testimony when
there has been no default or express joinder of issue. Ducote v. Ducote, 183
La. 886, 165 So. 133 (1936).
16. After issue was joined by the filing of an answer it was impossible
thereafter to file additional dilatory exceptions in limine.
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only twelve years. In 1837 the Supreme Court decided the case of
Magee v. Dunbar,17 in which the pertinent issue was whether a
defendant could incorporate dilatory exceptions in his answer
filed after default judgment had been rendered against him. De-
fendant relied on the code provision requiring that a default be
set aside when answer was filed prior to its confirmation.18 In-
stead of seeking the spirit of the code article invoked, and holding
that it permitted the defendant to file an answer after default but
did not empower him to incorporate dilatory exceptions therein,
the court applied the literal language of the article and upheld the
defendant's contentions.
Apparently, the decision in Magee v. Dunbar was not received
favorably by the profession, because two years later a statutory
provision was adopted, showing the obvious legislative intent to
overrule the unfortunate decision. However, instead of amending
the code article construed in the case, a separate legislative pro-
vision stipulated that, "Hereafter no dilatory exception shall be al-
lowed in any case after a judgment by default has been taken;
and in every case must be pleaded in limine litis, nor shall such
exceptions hereafter be admitted in any answer in any cause."19
The effect of legislative overruling proved much worse than
the decision sought to be overruled. In the effort to remedy the
narrow evil of Magee v. Dunbar, the doors were thrown open to
the much greater evil of stringing out the exceptions. No longer
were defendants required, or even permitted, to plead all of their
dilatory exceptions in the answer. They responded to the new
statute nobly by pleading these exceptions singly, forcing the
plaintiff to dispose of the exception by a trial thereof, then plead-
ing another, almost ad infinitum-the process being limited only
by the number of exceptions. However, the plaintiff was not left
entirely without a remedy. On one occasion the Supreme Court
not only denounced but prohibited the practice,2 0 but for some
reason-probably the questionable soundness of the decision 2 1 -
17. 10 La. 546 (1837).
18. "If the defendant on the very day when a definitive judgment by de-
fault was to have been rendered against him, appear and file his answer, the
first judgment taken shall be set aside." Art. 314, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
19. La. Act 53 of 1839, § 23.
20. McAlpine v. Jones, 13 La. Ann. 409 (1858).
21. The case would appear to be unsound. The first exception filed by the
defendant in question was the declinatory one to the citation, and after this
was overruled defendant filed an exception to the jurisdiction. This the court
refused to allow, saying: "A party will not be allowed thus to delay a trial
upon the merits of the cause by pleading singly, a variety of technical objec-
1938]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
this case does not appear to have been invoked. There was avail-
able to the plaintiff, moreover, the opportunity of moving for a
default immediately after the first dilatory exception had been
overruled, thus joining issue 22 and preventing the filing of addi-
tional dilatory exceptions. However, these preventives were more
theoretical than actual,23 and stringing out the exceptions became
firmly imbedded in Louisiana practice.
In the 1870 revision of the Code of Practice the statute just re-
ferred to was tacked on to Article 333 as a second paragraph there-
of. Despite the effect of this upon Articles 336 and 357, both of
these were retained as originally written.24 A decade later the
possible conflict between Articles 333 and 336 was presented
squarely in Chaffee v. Ludeling,25 and the Supreme Court held
that since the former represented the last expression of legislative
will it was controlling. The retention of Article 336 was labelled
''a piece of clumsy carelessness."
The possible effect of Article 333 of the Code of Practice of
1870 upon the code rules relative to joinder of issue has not been
settled by the jurisprudence. Prior to 1839 issue was joined ex-
pressly only by the filing of an answer, either admitting or deny-
ing the facts of the petition or incorporating dilatory exceptions
and peremptory exceptions relating to form.2 8 But after 1839 such
exceptions could not be incorporated into the answer. Did the per-
tinent code provision still retain its original meaning, or did it
now provide that issue was joined also by pleading such dilatory
or peremptory exceptions as he is bound to plead in limine litis?
If it meant the latter, this would be most important, for it would
suppress the practice of stringing out exceptions, 2 although its
effect upon the amendment of the petition would be unfortunate.2 8
tions tending to retard his adversary's action; obtaining thus a separate judg-
ment upon each, from the court of the first instance and from that of last
resort." McAlpine v. Jones, 13 La. Ann. 409, 410 (1858). But the court over-
looked the fact that if the defendant in question had pleaded the other ex-
ception with his exception to the citation the latter would be considered
waived. Cf. State v. Dupre, 46 La. Ann. 117, 14 So. 907 (1894) and cases cited
therein.
22. See note 15 supra.
23. A trial judge would rarely, If ever, permit the plaintiff to move for a
default if the defendant stood ready to file additional exceptions.
24. As Arts. 336, 357, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
25. 34 La. Ann. 962 (18S2).
26. Art. 357, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
27. If issue was joined by the filing of a dilatory exception or a peremp-
tory exception relating to form, It would be impossible to file thereafter any
dilatory exceptions in limine.
28. Art. 419, La. Code of Practice of 1870, prohibits the plaintiff from alter-
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At least one recent case29 strongly implies the joinder of issue by
the filing of dilatory exceptions.
By 1936 the practice of stringing out exceptions had proven so
obnoxious to the profession in this state that legislation was
adopted to prevent it. Article 333 was amended so as to require
that all dilatory exceptions be filed "at one and the same time,
otherwise they shall not be admitted."' 0 This amendment in turn
has presented grave and vexing problems.
Under Louisiana practice the term "dilatory exception" has
two meanings: a specific one which denotes the dilatory exception
properly so called; and a general one which embraces both the
latter and the declinatory exception."' Did the Legislature intend
to require that all declinatory exceptions and dilatory exceptions
(properly speaking) be filed at the same time, or did it intend that
only all the latter should be filed at the same time? There are
arguments available in support of either view.
Prior to the 1936 amendment it was well settled that declin-
atory exceptions were waived if, prior to the trial thereof, any
affirmative relief whatsoever was demanded of the court by de-
fendant. Thus, if a defendant pleaded declinatory and dilatory
exceptions at the same time, he was deemed to have waived the
former. 2 Although one of the cases supporting this position would
appear to be out of harmony with the present trend of liberality in
Louisiana,83 the doctrine served a useful purpose. There is nothing
in the amendatory legislation which would indicate any legisla-
tive intent to depart from this position. In addition, there was lit-
tle possibility of the defendant unduly delaying the trial of the
case through the separate filing and trial of declinatory excep-
tions."' The great evil to be remedied was to prevent the stringing
out of dilatory exceptions. Both of these facts would seem to indi-
cate a legislative intent to require only the filing of all dilatory
exceptions (properly speaking) at the same time.
Ing the substance of his demand by any amendment of the petition after issue
joined. (Joinder of issue after the filing of a dilatory exception would prevent
the plaintiff amending his petition so as to pray for additional relief.)
29. Self v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 178 La. 240, 151 So. 193 (1933).
30. La. Act 124 of 1936, amending and re-enacting Art. 333, La. Code of
Practice of 1870.
31. Art. 331, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
32. City National Bank of Selma v. Walker, 130 La. 810, 58 So. 580 (1912);
Iddle v. Hamler Boiler & Tank Co., 132 La. 476, 61 So. 532 (1913).
33. Cf. Reeves v. Globe Indemnity Co., 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936).
34. The declinatory exceptions (to jurisdiction ratione personae et mate-
riae, to citation, recusation and lis pendens) are few In number and rare in-
deed is the case whose facts permit the defendant to employ more than one.
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On the other hand, the fact that the 1936 amendment was
grafted on to Article 333, which even prior to 1936 was applicable
both to declinatory exceptions and dilatory exceptions, would
seem to show a legislative intention to insist upon the filing of
both types of exceptions at the same time.
Article 333 as amended was first construed in Brown v.
Gajan,8 a case decided by one of the intermediate appellate courts
of Louisiana. Plaintiff, invoking previously well settled principles,
contended that defendant had waived his exception to the juris-
diction of the court ratione personae by filing it at the same time
with the dilatory exception of inconsistency. Defendant coun-
tered with the argument that the article as amended not only per-
mitted but required the joinder of the two types of exceptions.
The court, assuming the legislative intent to require the filing of
both declinatory exceptions and dilatory exceptions (properly
speaking), held that the pleading of both types at the same time
was in strict compliance with the provisions of the amended
article, and that the effect thereof was not a waiver of the declin-
atory exception. 86 The holding of the case was approved in a
subsequent decision by another intermediate appellate court. 7 Un-
fortunately, the Supreme Court has not yet had an opportunity to
pass upon the question.
Under the present status of the matter, a defendant who feels
the necessity of pleading both a declinatory exception and a dila-
tory exception (properly speaking) is placed squarely between
the horns of a dilemma. If he relies on Brown v. Gajan and pleads
both types of exceptions he will be held to have waived his de-
clinatory exception if the Supreme Court concludes that the legis-
35. 173 So. 485 (La. App. 1937). A rehearing was granted and the original
decree set aside, but since the exception to the jurisdiction of the court was
finally maintained, the opinion of the court on rehearing necessarily affirmed
its original decision on the question involved. Brown v. Gajan, 175 So. 486
(La. App. 1937).
36. "The defendant could not plead these two exceptions at the same time
without placing them both before the court for its action, as the court would
have the right to pass on any matters pleaded before it so long as these mat-
ters were not withdrawn. In submitting both matters to the court for action
at the same time, from the very wording of his exceptions, and from the fact
that he was required to plead both exceptions at the same time, the situation
is the same as though defendant had pleaded and submitted his motion to re-
quire plaintiffs to elect in the disjunctive, or, in other words, that he was
submitting and urging this latter plea only in case the exception to the juris-
diction was overruled, thus giving the court the right to pass on the other.
We do not think under these circumstances that defendant has submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court as contemplated by article 98 of the
Code of Practice." Brown v. Gajan, 173 So. 485, 487-488 (La. App. 1937).
87. Schultz v. Long Island Machinery Co., 173 So. 569 (La. App. 1937).
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lative intent was only to require the filing of all dilatory excep-
tions (properly speaking) at the same time. On the other hand,
if he ignores Brown v. Gajan and attempts to plead the declina-
tory exception alone, he will be precluded from pleading the dila-
tory exception subsequently if the doctrine of the case is approved.
Similarly, he is placed in much the same position in pleading a
plurality of declinatory exceptions. 38 Under these circumstances
it is submitted that the defendant should be permitted to plead
his exceptions in the proper order and in the alternative, and
thereby avoid being impaled on either horn of his dilemma. In
this way, regardless of how our highest court may eventually de-
cide the case, the defendant will be protected. Despite the deci-
sion to the contrary,39 it is believed that, in view of the present
trend in Louisiana procedure away from technicalities and consid-
ering the recent expansion of the functions of alternative pleading
in this state,40 the Supreme Court would approve of this proce-
dure.
From the unfortunate results of the legislative efforts to pre-
vent the defendant from employing dilatory tactics, it can be seen
that the problem in Louisiana has not yet been solved. In at-
tempting to escape from the consequences of the erroneous de-
cision in Magee v. Dunbar, the statute of 1839 increased the evil
effects of dilatory tactics. In the revision of 1870, the effort to in-
tegrate our procedure caused this legislation to be added on to Ar-
ticle 333, thus conflicting with Article 336 and probably broaden-
ing the provisions of Article 357. The stringing out of exceptions,
introduced by the 1839 statute and affirmed by the 1870 revision,
was sought to be suppressed by the 1936 amendment to Article
333. This in turn has presented unfortunate complications. The
38. Declinatory exceptions should be pleaded in a certain order, otherwise
the defendant will be held to have waived all but the last one. Cf. Brannin v.
Clements, 142 So. 621 (La. App. 1932); Godchaux v. Texas & P. Ry. Co.,
151 La. 955, 92 So. 398 (1932); Tutorship of the Minor Heirs of Byland, 38 La.
Ann. 756 (1886). In these cases it was held that an exception to the jurisdic-
tion waived a prior exception to the citation. Cf. also Ford v. Russel, 13 La.
App. 390, 128 So. 310 (1930), which used the following language: "...by volun-
tarily appearing through his... attorney at law, he has waived his objection to
the form of the commencement of the proceeding . . . " It seems to follow
that an appearance and the filing of an exception of lis pendens would amount
to a general appearance and waive any right to except subsequently to the
jurisdiction.
39. Iddle v. Hamler Boiler & Tank Co., 132 La. 476, 61 So. 532 (1913).
40. By Haas v. McCain, 161 La. 114, 108 So. 305 (1926); Wells v. Davidson,
149 So. 246 (La. App. 1933); Succession of Markham, 180 La. 211, 156 So. 225
(1934).
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run in the seamless weave of the law tends to lengthen. Where
will it end?
It is submitted that a return to first principles should be ef-
fected. Article 333 should be amended to read as it did in the Code
of Practice of 1825. The code provision which caused the initial
difficulty in Magee v. Dunbar should be amended so as to over-
rule the doctrine of this case and do nothing more.". In this way
Louisiana will not only solve the problem without producing un-
fortunate consequences, but the return to our earlier practice
would bring us results quite similar to those effected by the new
Federal Rules. 2
Guy WIMBERLY, JR.
DURATION AND REVOCABILITY OF AN OFFER
The basic principles and practical application of Articles
1800-1804 and 1809 of the Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870,
dealing with the duration of an offer and the timeliness of an ac-
ceptance, have never been explained satisfactorily as a system.
It is the purpose of this comment to attempt an explanation of
them in terms of their probable origin and in conformity with the
theories accepted at the time of their redaction.
The Civil Code of 18081 and the Code Napoleon2 were almost
identical in the title of Obligations; they contained no specific
rules on offer and acceptance and only provided that the consent
of the party obligating himself was essential to the formation of
the contract.' The articles here under consideration were first
41. Art. 317, La. Code of Practice of 1870, as amended by La. Act 85 of
1922, should be further amended so as to read as follows: "It shall be suffi-
cient in all cases for a defendant to file his answer at any time before the
confiirmation of a judgment taken by default against him; provided, however,
that no exceptions incorporated in any answer filed after a judgment of de-
fault has been rendered against defendant shall be admitted."
42. Cf. Rule 12, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of Orleans,
with Alterations and Amendments adapted to its Present System of Govern-
ment (1808).
2. Le Code Civil des Frangais (1804) (commonly referred to as the "Code
Napoleon").
3. La. Civil Code of 1808, p. 261, 3. 3. 8; Art. 1108, French Civil Code. The
rules of offer and acceptance were considered within the field of evidence
and not substantive law. See Art. 1797, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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